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Income changes and Labor Forces Participation, by Gary W. 
Sorenson, is not only important as a contribution to the theoretical 
foundations of the workings of the labor market, but it  will 
doubtlessly trigger off further studies of a statistical nature as 
attempts are made to use Professor Sorenson's operational cate­
gorization of the variables. 
Sorenson's analysis is, in essence, an attempt to explain the 
effect of a change in wages upon the supply of labor. He shows 
how awkward the concept is of a person being either "in the 
labor force" or out of it. On one hand, a wage decrease discour­
ages workers from giving up their leisure; at the same time, by 
reducing their income, it gives them an incentive to greater labor 
in order to maintain their income levels. The notion of leisure is 
misleading, the author argues, because it suggests that the alterna­
tive to working for wages is doing nothing. 
To sort out the differences between a person who is "in the 
labor force" and one who is not, it is first necessary to consider 
the family as a productive unit in which by one manner or 
another each member contributes to the welfare of the group. 
This notion of group welfare and its relation to individual welfare 
is a sticky one, and Sorenson does not minimize the difficulties. 
Nonetheless, the point at issue is that the family welfare is not 
enlarged solely by working for money wages. Rather, since the 
process of consumption takes time and activity, each member of 
the family may contribute to its utility whether or not he is "in 
the labor force." That is to say, the traditional conception of 
consumption as a passive act of enjoyment of commodities which 
are literally "goods," must be amended to consider the family as 
a sort of productive enterprise even though the product is con­
sumer satisfaction, utility. 
To be sure, the product is apparently a thing of air, but the 
analysis is no less real or significant than the manufacturing of 
washtubs and teakettles. Indeed, this is a very important advance 
in  itself, to show that consumption is comprehensible as an 
analog of production, with all the efficiency concepts transposed. 
vii The notion of efficient consumers is not new with Sorensonhe 
explicitly builds on the previous literaturebut its application to 
the labor market by others is recent, and Sorenson's treatment 
advances the inquiry further. 
Another way of saying all this is that the mother who stays 
home and tends to family welfare is not nonproductive of nation­
al income. Sorenson's method derives "dual prices" which explic­
itly impute a value to her labor based on the changing technology 
of the process of consumption. He is getting at fundamental 
changes that have been taking place in family life as well as the 
labor market in the United States. 
Part of the problem with preceding studies has been the use 
of traditional calculus methods of making the optimum use of the 
money income and time limitations facing every family. Sorenson 
points out that the formal process of finding a derivative and 
setting it equal to zero to maximize a function, requires that the 
derivative exist and therefore precludes solutions that will exam­
ine the "corners" or "kinks" of a function. The upshot of the 
traditional method is that everyone who is to be considered must 
do some work which is sold on the marketeven if it is a little 
bit. If a person does not work for money wages, then he is out of 
the labor force and somehow appears not to be optimizing family 
welfare. The author uses the technique of nonlinear programming 
associated with Kuhn and Tucker in which optimization is carried 
out without these artificial requirements. 
Sorenson's contribution is an extremely valuable one of 
clearing away the underbrush so that econometric work may take 
place in separating the counteracting forces in labor participation 
resulting from wage changes. His work is elegant and correct. To 
be sure,  it  is  a monograph and not a treatise. Someday the 
empirical work has to be done to measure participationand I 
hope Dr. Sorenson will do it. Nonetheless, he provides us with 
important insights and he brings to bear powerful tools of analy­
sis in a field of economics that has long needed careful investi­
gation. 
Murray Wolfson 
Oregon State University 
and Ahmadu Bello University (Nigeria) 
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ix INCOME CHANGES AND 
LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION 
This monograph is focused around the controversy in the eco­
nomic literature regarding the effects of income changes on labor 
force participation. In particular, this controversy arises from the 
opposing hypotheses: the "additional worker" and the "discour­
aged worker." Each hypothesis predicts different behavior in 
response to falling income or rising unemployment. Empirical 
analyses have failed to terminate the controversy. This study 
attempts to clarify the issues involved through theoretical analysis 
and, in so doing, to provide additional theoretical restrictions that 
may be incorporated in the statistical testing problem. 
In 1965, Gary Becker outlined a model of consumer behavior in 
his article "A Theory of the Allocation of Time" (Economic 
Journal, September). This model was adopted as the basic deci­
sion model. It was modified to incorporate a family, following 
Paul Samuelson's suggestion in his 1956 article "Social Indiffer­
ence Curves" (Quarterly Journal of Economics, February). 
The model was first approached by way of the calculus. The 
character of the model, however, turns out to be such that the 
calculus is inapplicable. The calculus is unable to assure the 
satisfaction of both an income and a time constraint; theoreti­
cally, it permits the substitution of time between individuals as 
well as the time of a single individual when time is segmented, 
and it also requires each individual to work some portion of each 
time period. 
For these reasons, the analysis was restated as a nonlinear pro­
gramming problem. In contrast to Becker's analysis, this formu­
lation of the problem has work time as an explicit endogenous 
variable. For analytical reasons, the Kuhn-Tucker optimal con­
ditions were stated and assumed to hold. For post-optimality 
analysis, the problem was then converted to a linear programming 
problem with the Kuhn-Tucker conditions as the constraints; the 
variables are the internal shadow prices which, in this case, are the 
marginal utilities of time for the family members and the family 
marginal utility of income. 
1 For purposes of analyzing labor force participation behavior, the 
wage rate parameters were varied. Two hypotheses emerge and 
the basis for differentiating between them hinges upon three 
factors: (1) the manner in which the relevant marginal utilities 
have changed; (2) whether the optimal activity set has been 
altered; and (3) whether there may be a number of time-intensive 
and inferior activities in the optimal activity set at positive levels. 
One hypothesis is a clear statement of the additional worker 
position, while the other is, effectively, the discouraged worker 
thesis. I. THE LABOR SUPPLY AND MICRO THEORY 
A systematic theory of the labor supply of recognized import in 
economics, comparable to the theory of market demand, has long 
been conspicuously missing. The most obvious explanation for 
this is to be found in the complexity of the labor supply concept 
itself and in the unavoidable dynamics of labor market analysis. 
This is not to say that efforts have not been made in this area. 
Paul Douglas  [8, pp. 269-272] * outlines the rudiments of labor 
supply theory in his classic,  The Theory of Wages. At one point 
Douglas quotes the mercantilist, Thomas Manly, suggesting or 
implying a theory of  1669 vintage. Manly said, in relation to the 
effect of wages on the laborer's propensity to work, "the men 
have just so much the more to spend in tipple and remain now 
poorer than when their wages were less  They work so 
much the fewer days by how much more they exact in wages"  [8, 
p.  270]. The implication is, of course, a negatively sloping supply 
curvea proposition that can be arrived at through more rigorous 
analysis. Douglas continues to point out the mercantilist belief 
that the labor supply curve is not only negatively sloping but of 
unit elasticity with respect to wages. 
A more precise statement of a labor supply theory began to 
emerge in the neoclassical era. Alfred Marshall, in the tradition of 
Jevons, speaks of the "discommodities" of labor and the "mar­
ginal disutility" of labor [cf., 21, pp. 140-141] .  Due to the 
increasing marginal disutility of labor, Marshall and Jevons ration­
alized a rising supply price for additional labor, i.e., a positively 
sloped supply curve with equilibrium at the point of equality 
between the ratio of the marginal utility of income to the 
marginal disutility of labor and the wage rate. However, by 1921 
the theory here was not firmly established, and Frank Knight says 
in regard to the supply curve of labor: 
It is usual, because superficially "natural" to assume that a 
man will work more, i.e., work harder or more hours per 
dayfor a higher wage than for a lower one. But a little 
examination will show that this assumption is for rational 
behavior incorrect. In so far as men act rationally, i.e., from 
fixed motives subject to the law of diminishing utilitythey 
will at a higher rate divide their time between wage-earning 
*Italic numbers in brackets refer to References Cited, page 63. 
3 and non-industrial uses in such a way as to earn more 
money, indeed, but to work fewer  hours. Just where the 
balance will be struck depends upon the shape of the curve 
of comparison between money (representing the group of 
things purchasable with money) and leisure (representing all 
non-pecuniary, alternative uses of time). We therefore draw 
our momentary supply line in terms of price with some 
downward slope [16, p. 117] . 
J. R. Hicks, speaking of the question of the negatively sloping 
supply curve of labor in 1932, says "there is no logical justifica­
tion for this view" [15, p. 98] . He goes on to suggest1 that  the 
expenditure of income is a matter of habit with many expenses of 
a prearranged nature. The use of leisure, on  the other hand, is 
much less a matter of habit. Regarding leisure there are  fewer 
commitments and, says Hicks, "if the work done becomes less 
remunerative, it  is easier to sacrifice leisure than to sacrifice 
income" [15, p. 98]. It is particularly interesting to note two 
things in Hicks' writing on this matter. First, he continues to 
accept the asserted dichotomy between working for pay  (labor) 
and nonwork-oriented activity (leisure). While there is an appar­
ent dichotomy in the time allocation of individuals and, as a 
matter of definition complete freedom in choice of language, the 
labor-leisure references carry the Marshallian-Jevons inspired con­
notation with regard to marginal (dis)utility, and this writer will 
challenge the necessity for such a connotation below.  Second, it 
is  interesting to note Hicks' recognition of nonphysiological, 
institutional restrictions on the labor supply decisionan obvious 
appreciation of the complexity involved in explaining, theoreti­
cally or otherwise, the determinants of the labor supply relation. 
Currently, intermediate and advanced courses in micro economics 
frequently consider analyses of the individual labor supply sched­
ule couched in the language and framework of neoclassical mar­
ginalism. Assuming the increasing marginal disutility of labor and 
the diminishing marginal utility of income, it  is possible to 
specify the conditions under which the labor supply schedule of 
the individual will be either positive or negatively sloping. Two 
examples of this are provided by Lloyd [20, pp. 31-34] and 
Henderson and Quandt [14, pp. 23-24] . 
James Duesenberry, agreeing with Clarence Long, says: 
And to take issue with Lionel Robbins who, in 1930, wrote of a 
negatively sloping supply curve. See Economica, June 1930. 
4 The effective labor supply at any moment depends on four 
factors: (1) the size of the population and its composition 
by age, sex, ethnic origin, and geographical location; (2) 
labor-force participation rates for each group in the popula­
tion; (3) the occupational distribution of the labor force 
(which influences productivity); and (4) working hours [9, 
p. 309] . 
He goes on to suggest that these factors are dynamic and con­
stantly changing and "a very large part of the change must be 
attributed to factors which are largely independent of the balance 
between supply of and demand for labor" [9, p. 309]. 
Stanley Lebergott allocated a chapter of Manpower and Eco­
nomic Growth to a discussion of the labor supply concept. In 
prefacing that discussion, Lebergott says, "The structure and 
dimensions of the labor supply are fixed by economic forces, 
forces that operate within political and social limits" [19, p. 29]. 
While less specific than the Duesenberry statement, the character 
of complexity of labor supply analysis is, again, accented. One 
thing is clear from this brief review: the labor force and the labor 
supply are not synonymous; this was emphasized earlier by Dur­
and in 1948. Durand said: 
The supply of labor, as understood by economists, is not 
the same as the labor force. Labor supply is not defined as a 
number of workers but as a quantity of work offered in the 
market, taking account the number of hours which each 
individual is willing to work if not other variables such as 
efficiency and intensity of effort [JO, p. 86]. 
The economist's interest and focus on the size and variation of 
the  labor  force,  as  distinct from the labor supply, can be 
attributed to the depression of the 1930's and the birth of 
Keynesian economics. The impact of mass unemployment on the 
American psyche in conjunction with the convincing denial by 
Keynes in 1936 that automatic market adjustment to full em­
ployment could be relied upon in the short run, stressed the 
requirement for improved knowledge in this area. The directions 
that research efforts have taken here have been quite varied. 
Much work has been of a strictly descriptive nature; fitting this 
description is John Durand's work referred to above as well as 
most of the work done by Gertrude Bancroft [2] , Seymour 
Wolfbein  [28],  and even Stanley Lebergott, also referred to 
above. These efforts have emphasized the changing demographic 
5 as well as economic characteristics of the labor force. While the 
list of research efforts bearing on the size and quality of the labor 
force is lengthy, the number dealing specifically with the cyclical 
effects of unemployment and income changes on the labor force 
is relatively few. Since the present project is concerned with this 
area, the most prominent of the latter group will be considered in 
some detail. Before doing this, however, a few more introductory 
observations are in order. 
While no mention was made of this, labor supply theory in the 
mercantilist, classical, and neoclassical eras (what little there was) 
was concerned with the secular determination  of labor supply, 
The theory attempted to relate wagesreal wages in particularto 
the labor supply. The population and the labor force could not be 
regarded as synonymous; however, the relation was regarded as 
close, and variation in the ratio of the latter to the former was 
not recognized as a problem. In speaking of this point, Philip 
Hauser says: 
Labor mobility in respect to labor force participation is a 
relatively recent phenomenon in human history. As a con­
cept  it  is  applicable to a mass population only in our 
modern urban industrial society. Consideration of changes 
in the population of "workers" as distinct from changes in 
the population in general presupposes a society in which 
"work" is differentiated from other activities such as play, 
education, worship, or courtship. In a preindustrial, folk 
type of society in which work is not sharply differentiated 
from other types of life  activity,  it  is not possible to 
consider entrance to, and exit from, a working population 
p. 81. 
The United States economy of the 1930's (not to speak of the 
present character of the economy) was of the industrial type 
described by Hauser and distinguishes between work and other 
activities. In the latter years of the depression decade, serious 
empirical work was being done on the cyclical determinants of 
the labor force fluctuation. 
In the late 1930's, W. Woytinsky was conducting research on the 
effects of unemployment on labor force participation. World War 
II diverted America's concern with unemployment and misery to 
more pressing matters. But upon returning to peacetime problems 
in 1945, the United States Congress saw fit to reflect on the 
6 tragedy of the 1930's; the fruit of their efforts was the Employ­
ment Act of 1946. Displaying an awareness, if not the knowledge, 
of Keynesian analysis, the Employment Act of 1946 formally 
recognized the responsibility of the federal government to, among 
other things, "promote maximum employment, production, and 
purchasing power." Although it has swung in pendulum fashion, 
concern over maintaining full employment has not been reduced 
at the federal level of government. To the contrary, a general 
awareness of the effects of technological change and automation 
on the demand for labor has generated, since about 1961, an 
approach known as "manpower policy"a policy explicitly rec­
ognizing the role of the supply side of labor market equations in 
affecting the equilibrium of this market. In 1964, the Senate 
Subcommittee on Employment and Manpower [27] formally 
recommended the merging of our 1946 type, Keynesian-oriented 
employment policy with the newer manpower policy in order to 
deal adequately with labor market developments. If only on a de 
facto basis, this wedding has probably been, or is being, achieved; 
at least present government policy seems to reflect recognition of 
both the forces of supply and demand. 
From an economist's point of view the most pressing questions, 
given the federal government's concern for full employment and 
the general agreement upon the derived nature of the demand for 
labor, still pertain to the determinants of the supply of labor and, 
perhaps most importantly, to the cyclical determinants. Since 
Woytinsky's pioneering efforts, there have been numerous schol­
arly attempts at resolving these questions. Much attention has 
been given to the effect of unemployment on the labor force 
participation rate since unemployment affects income and hence, 
by way of conventional demand theory, affects budget con­
straints and levels of utility or welfare. From such effects we 
would expect responses by individuals at the micro level and by 
the population at the macro level; such responses should be 
reflected in labor markets if the price system has an influence. It 
will be contended below that existing responses to questions in 
this particular area have not resolved the issues. It will further be 
contended that our continuing relative ignorance in this area is 
due to two factors. First, earlier efforts to answer questions in 
this area have continually failed to adequately specify the set of 
micro relations that must exist in order to explain labor market 
behavior or predict responses to changing parameters. Second, 
there is the ever-present problem that, even given an "adequate" 
7 set of micro relations, our existing body of data preclude careful 
testing of the hypotheses. With these observations in mind, the 
overriding, but limited, objectives of the present analysis can now 
be outlined. 
In the analysis below, Chapter II will present a summary outline 
of the major existing attempts to respond to the question of the 
effects of income changes on labor force participation. In Chapter 
III,  since whatever micro relations exist must arise out of a 
consumer-oriented model, brief mention will be made of two 
recent advances in the area of consumer theory. The question of 
the relevant micro unit will also be raised. In Chapter IV, two 
approaches to a model of household behavior will be developed. 
The first will emphasize the consumption aspects of the house­
hold, and the calculus will be relied on as the major analytical 
tool; the second model will be a nonlinear programming model 
which emphasizes the time allocation aspects of the household. 
Chapter V will review the hypotheses and implications of the 
theoretical analysis. 
8 II. A SHORT SURVEY OF RELEVANT 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
The list of analyses which have endeavored to account for the 
effects of income changes on labor force participation is not 
extensive. Woytinsky led in 1940, and, by making certain explicit 
hypotheses about the character of this relationship, provided a 
basis for controversy which has been taken up by a handful of 
economists. All the work in this area has not been limited to the 
effects of income changes; other factors affecting work-oriented 
activity have been considered. In particular, the effects of demo­
graphic changes in the population on the labor force as well as the 
factors which might affect preferences and the effect on demand 
of changing technology have been considered. These factors are 
generally regarded as changing secularly and do not strongly 
influence the making of short-run employment policy; income 
and employment changes do influence cyclical variation. Also, 
most analyses discuss the effects of unemployment on participa­
tion; the reason for this emphasis is the well recognized close 
relationship between unemployment and the flow of income and 
the ready availability of aggregate labor force data. In this section 
the methodology and hypotheses of six such studies will be 
reviewed and criticized. The objective is to attempt to discern 
why the relevant question here (viz., what is the effect of income 
and/or employment changes on labor force participation) remains 
interesting. 
In 1940, Woytinsky, in a pamphlet [291, expressed his so-called 
"additional worker" hypothesis. In 1942, after a polemical bout 
with Don Humphrey in the Journal of Political Economy Woy­
tinsky reaffirmed his conviction that in depressions family mem­
bers who otherwise would be "out of the labor force" are moved 
into active participation because of unemployment experienced 
by primary breadwinners. More completely, he says: 
The additional workers who are in the labor force because 
the usual earners in their families are unemployed may be 
described as "additional depression workers" provided that 
the term "depression" is not restricted to the lowest point 
of the business cycle. Local and partial slumps, as well as 
technological changes resulting in layoffs, are likely to add 
new jobseekers to the ranks of the unemployed even if the 
overall business conditions prevailing at the time are gener­
9 ally good. Consequently, "additional depression workers" 
may be present on the labor market wherever and whenever 
some usual workers are out of work, but they are naturally 
most numerous during depressions [30, p. 106] . 
The significance of this proposition to Woytinsky lay in the fact 
that, if true, the number of jobs necessary to reduce unemploy­
ment to a minimum "may be appreciably less than the reported 
volume of unemployment would suggest" [30, p. 106] --an obser­
vation that was equally meaningful in the early 1960's. 
The aggregate labor force relation is suggested by Woytinsky to 
be of the form, SL = SL[f(t), g(s), h(c)J. In this relation f(t) is 
the trend relation and is affected by changing population and 
demographic factors; this portion of SI,  changes slowly and 
predictably. The component g(s) is the seasonal portion of SL 
and implies recognition of the influence of demand; the impact 
on unemployment is not suggested as serious. Demand, of course, 
has a primary influence on the component h(c), the cyclical 
portion of the relation; it  is h(c) that reflects the movement of 
additional workers due to changing business conditions. It was 
this hypothesized relation, h(c), that Woytinsky was primarily 
concerned with because of its policy implications.' 
To test his hypothesis about additional workers, Woytinsky began 
by defining total unemployment as consisting of the sum of 
"primary" and "secondary" unemployment. The former referred 
to "unemployment due to an inadequate number of jobs for 
usual gainful workers," while the latter was "unemployment 
accounted for by new job seekers from families in which the 
usual earners are unemployed," and it was this secondary or 
additional group that he wanted to measure. The "gainful work­
er" reference pertains to a concept employed by census enumera­
tors prior to 1940. According to Seymour Wolfbein, prior to that 
year "census enumerators recorded the occupation of every per­
son ten or more years of age who said that he or she followed an 
occupation in which money or its equivalent was earned. A 
gainful worker was one who reported a gainful occupation." For 
more information on this point see Wolfbein [28, pp. 17-18]. 
1The notation here must be regarded as the author's interpreta­
tion of Woytinsky's exposition on this point. For Woytinsky's 
treatment cf. [30, pp. 110-111  . 
10 For these terms to be operationally meaningful, direct historical 
family data would have been required. In the absence of this data, 
Woytinsky attempted to use indirect cross section data in his 
analysis. That is, he attempted to infer from the composition of 
the labor force the number of "additional" workers. Given this 
task, he found it necessary to assume statistical independence 
between the chance of unemployment in a household and the 
number of usual earners. The purpose of this assumption was to 
afford the opportunity of saying something about the number of 
workers in a household and the incidence of unemployment. 
According to Woytinsky: 
The exact number of workers these families would have had 
if  their usual earners were employed is, of course, un­
known, but it may be assumed with rough approximation
that, except for additional workers, there would be no 
substantial difference between the structure of these fam­
ilies and of those without unemployed members [30, p. 
116] . 
Woytinsky's data appeared to support his additional worker 
hypothesis. 
However, in 1958 Clarence Long expressed his suspicion of the 
Woytinsky hypothesis. In his monumental study,12/1,Long found 
the additional worker hypothesis untenable with the census data. 
While agreeing that there are surely some workers fitting the 
additional worker description in conditions of rising unemploy­
ment, he said that the net effect is to discourage more prospective 
workers than are encouraged. Long said that this makes more 
sense than ever when the effect of unemployment is regarded in 
conjunction with the diminished real income per worker in de­
pressions. 
In methodology, Long relied extensively on his statistical anal­
ysis. Several assumed economic relations were suggested and then 
analyzed statistically. Among these suggested relations were the 
following: (1) What is the statistical relation between labor force 
participation and earnings? Straight correlation analysis by census 
year and for thirty-eight large  cities was employed, and the 
relation was found to be inverse. (2) What is the effect of 
depression (unemployment) on labor force participation? This 
too was found to be an inverse relation. Other relations between 
economic or demographic factors and participation along specific 
11 age-sex lines were also investigated. Statistical conclusions were 
offered as prima facie evidence of explanation. 
Long's analysis was a contribution to the study of the labor 
supply relation in that it recognized the multiplicity of factors 
affecting this relation. Long did not, however, sufficiently detail 
the characteristics of a person who would likely be discouraged 
by rising unemployment or by falling income. He tended to 
regard the net observable effects as sufficient to confirm his 
hypothesis after deciding that a particular point in time was 
characterized by "depression."2 
On the basis of casual empiricism and introspective answers to 
hypothetical questions, both the additional worker and the dis­
couraged worker hypotheses seem plausible. Rather than close 
the door on the question of the effect of unemployment on labor 
force participation, Long's study merely whetted the interests of 
many people, and several interesting studies have been published 
since 1958. 
For example, in 1961 W. Lee Hansen published The Cyclical 
Sensitivity of the Labor Supply [13, pp. 299-309] . Realizing the 
shortcoming of using net labor force data, as published by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics on a monthly basis, to test hypotheses 
of the type discussed above, Hansen employed the so-called gross 
change data generated from the monthly Current Population 
Survey. These data have not been regularly published since 1953 
because of some built-in bias they involve [cf., 23] ; however, the 
data do emphasize the high degree of labor force mobility dis­
played by the adult civilian population and also allow a finer 
breakdown in the characteristics of "movers." For example, these 
data recognize that unemployment in any month equals unem­
ployment in the previous month plus the new disemployed, plus 
additions to the labor force from keeping house, in school, or the 
"other" categories, minus the reemployed, minus reductions from 
2It is interesting to note in regard to the 1940 census data, that
Woytinsky attributed the declining overall participation rate to a
state of "balanced prosperity" in the economy. Long retaliated 
that the data showed eight million people either seeking work or
on work relief and that this was 15 percent of the labor force. 
Long said 1940 was a depression year; he attributed the falling
participation rate to the discouragement effect. See Long [21, pp. 
197-198] . the labor force consisting of people going back into the three 
categories mentioned as additions. This is strictly an operational 
definition and the data allow such categorization. Thus, these 
data permit one to interpret, e.g., a net rise in unemployment as 
arising from an increase in disemployment or from additions to 
the labor force from the nonlabor force categories or some 
combination of the two. 
In methodology, Hansen started by adopting the peak-trough 
months of the 1948-49, 1953-54, and 1957-58 business cycles 
(defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research) as refer­
ence points and then tabularized the percentage of the civilian 
labor force which each of the above-mentioned quantities con­
sisted of at each of the months. Then Hansen asks, "What kind of 
impact do gross change movements exert on the level of unem­
ployment and what is the significance of these movements for the 
hypotheses under consideration?"3 
In answer, Hansen charts his data month by month (as opposed 
to just peak-trough months) and compares the pattern of unem­
ployment with the patterns of additions to and reductions from 
the labor force. From this he concludes: 
The combined evidence on both additions to and reduc­
tions in unemployment where movement is to or from
outside the labor force suggests that Woytinsky's 
hypothesisthat the influx of additional work-seekers raises 
the unemployment level in periods of high or rising unem­
ploymentis not supported by the data for much of the
postwar period. On the contrary, whatever increases in 
additions did occur were effectively cancelled out by in­
creases in reductions, in precisely the manner suggested by 
Long's hypothesis. Consequently, the Woytinsky hypoth­
esis must be rejected while Long's is supported by the data 
[13, p. 304] . 
Hansen's concentration on the two-way movement and use of 
gross change data must be recognized as a contribution to the 
literature in this area. But on completion, the Hansen analysis 
3The hypotheses he refers to are the "additional" and "discour­
aged" worker hypotheses. As for his question,  it  seems the 
obverse question would be more relevant, i.e., what impact does
unemployment have on the pattern of gross change movements?
[11, p. 303]. 
13 could be consistent with several interpretations. The source of 
this uncertainty lies with the lack of a clearly stated theoretical 
base. Put another way, Hansen, like Long and Woytinsky, was 
more concerned with accounting for the  data than with the 
behavior which generated the data; this approach leaves open the 
question of what was "explained." 
In the November 1964 Review of Economics and Statistics, 
Kenneth Strand and Thomas Dernberg published a study of the 
"Cyclical Variation in Civilian Labor Force Participation." The 
initial objective of their study was to close the door on the 
Woytinsky-Long controversy. Strand and Dernberg employed 
multiple regression analysis in attempting to relate "demand" 
(the ratio of employment, E, to civilian population , P) and ex­
haustions (the ratio of new unemployment compensation exhaus­
tions, X, to P) to the aggregate labor force participation rate, LIP. 
The signs on the coefficients were "presumed" [25, p. 380] and 
they utilized time series data over 186 months. After a "number 
of trials" they emerged with positive and significant coefficients 
for (EIP)t and (X/P)t+2. 
These results were interpreted as being consistent with both the 
Woytinsky and Long hypotheses. As demand falls, participation 
declines, but this leads to an increase in exhaustions in the future 
thus "encouraging" additional work seekers to enter the labor 
force; hence, both Long and Woytinsky are vindicated in part. 
William G. Bowen and T. A. Finegan, in conjunction with the 
University of California's four-year study of unemployment and 
the American economy, were the next to publish comments in 
this area. The Bowen and Finegan paper appeared as a chapter, 
entitled "Labor Force Participation and Unemployment," in a 
collection edited by Arthur Ross [4, pp. 115-161] . 
As their title indicates, and like the previously described studies, 
their primary interest was with the effect of unemployment on 
labor force participation. But, Bowen and Finegan were more 
ambitious than this. Specifically, their objectives were: 
(1)	  To estimate the effects of differences in local labor 
market conditions on the labor force participation 
rates of various subsets of the populationteen-age 
males, teen-age females, "prime age" males, married 
14 women, and older males being the five main groups 
studied. 
(2)	  To see whether this relation has changed over time. 
(3)	  To learn more about the effects on labor force par­
ticipation of factors other than unemployment 
factors such as educational attainments, earnings op­
portunities, other income (nonlabor), and color [4, 
pp. 115-1161. 
Single-equation, multiple-regression techniques were used by Bo­
wen and Finegan on cross section data for metropolitan areas 
derived from the 1940, 1950, and 1960 decennial censuses. The 
dependent variable in each of their equations was the relevant 
labor force participation rate. But, the independent variables were 
not quite so obvious to come by. They said in this regard: 
The main considerations which we would expect, a priori, 
to determine whether or not an individual participates in 
the labor force can be grouped conveniently under three 
familiar headings: "Tastes," "Affluence," and "Incentives" 
[4, p. 1181. 
Tastes were recognized as unmeasurable and, therefore, taken as 
given. However, affluence was interpreted in "net" terms; this 
was done by adjusting the gross financial position of the individ­
ual or family for the number of family members or for age. 
Hence, for example, reductions in net affluence due to unemploy­
ment of primary breadwinners may encourage additional workers 
to enter the labor force. Their motivational force, "incentives," is 
also put in net terms. For example, the expected monetary wage 
rate for working must be placed in juxtaposition with the mon­
etary and nonmonetary costs of going to work. These latter costs 
are influenced by such things as the number of young children in 
a family or, perhaps, the loss of welfare payments or the low 
expected likelihood of work (i.e., the discouragement effect). 
Except for "unemployment" and "schooling," the list of inde­
pendent variables adopted for each of the five4 age-sex categories 
4These categories were (1) males, ages 14-19, (2) males, ages
25-54, (3) males, age 65 and over, (4) single females, ages 14-19, 
and (5) married women; see [4, pp. 123-1251. 
15 selected for analysis varied somewhat. Regarding unemployment, 
it  is interesting to note that the sign of the coefficient for this 
variable, when regressed against the relevant labor force participa­
tion rate, was negative (and significant in most cases) in each of 
the five groups for the three census years. The obvious conclusion 
on the part of Bowen and Finegan was, of course,  that rising 
unemployment "discourages" labor force participation. The auth­
ors went one step further here. They interpreted this obversed 
inverse relationship between labor force participation and unem­
ployment as evidence that rising or chronic periods of unemploy­
ment contribute to what has come to be called "hidden" unem­
ployment. 5 
Woytinsky was not unrepresented in the Bowen and Finegan 
equations, however. Each regression equation included one or 
more variables reflecting income. In the case  of "older" males, 
income was reflected by median income the preceding year of all 
males who worked for fifty to fifty-two weeks and by "other" 
nonwage income. For married women similar variables were em­
ployed. In each of these cases the coefficient signs were negative, 
suggesting that the loss of family income tended to encourage 
participation and support the additional worker hypothesis. The 
conclusion, then, agrees in part with both Woytinsky and Long. 
While not in our chronological sequence, another labor  force 
study must be mentioned. In 1958, Richard N. Rosett published 
an analysis entitled "Working Wives:  An Econometric Study" 
[6] .  Rosett's broad objective was to "determine whether the 
decision of a wife to enter the labor force is influenced  by the 
demographic and economic characteristics of the household  of 
which she is a member." The independent variables Rosett con­
sidered included the husband's wage rate, the wife's wage rate, 
changes in debt holdings, presence and age of children,  and 
education. He used data from the 1954 Survey of  Consumer 
Finances to infer something of the effect of the independent 
variables listed above on the labor force participation of wives. 
5 More will be said of hidden unemployment presently.  However, 
as it is currently used, the term refers to some unknown number 
of persons who prematurely withdraw from the labor force due 
to low expectations toward employment opportunities  and is 
interpreted as an involuntary predicament for persons in this 
group. For more information on this see [26] . 
16 Ordinary single-equation, multiple-regression techniques were em­
ployed by Rosett in his statistical analysis, but the signs of the 
coefficients were anticipated by developing sign conditions which 
emerged from an economic optimization model, and this was the 
novel aspect of Rosett's study. He assumed that the basic deci­
sion-making unit was the household, consisting of two or more 
individuals, but, in the event of more than two, the labor force 
decision applied only to the husband and wife. The household 
was assumed to maximize a conventional ordinal utility function, 
U = U(Y, P), where Y = income and P= labor force participation 
of the wife (the husband's participation rate was assumed to be 
1). The budget constraint for the household was Y = H + R + WP, 
where H = husband's wage rate, R = property income, and W = 
wife's wage rate. 
While Rosett said U(Y, P) applied for the spending unit [6, p. 
62] ,  he clearly was not implying that he had solved the com­
munity indifference curve problem. Rather, since the husband's 
participation was assumed to be full time and H and R are 
assumed constant, the problem becomes one in which the wife 
chooses P such that U(Y, P) is maximized. 
Rosett's procedure from here was straightforward, except for 
some confusion on the curvature of his indifference curves [6, p. 
91] .  He developed first and second-order conditions for utility 
maximization; then he developed the Slutsky equations for the 
effect of changes in H and R, and then posited certain things 
which might affect U. This procedure is commendable and, what 
is more, it offers the opportunity to generate answers about the 
effect of other things on labor force behavior. 
This concludes summary descriptions of the major studies which 
have concentrated upon the cyclical effects of unemployment on 
the labor force. But, for several reasons, an interest in the topic 
has not been concluded because the question has not yet convin­
cingly been answered. Perhaps this is explained by the multi­
plicity of statistical analyses and approaches that have been 
performed. Such multiplicity hints of a variety of possible theo­
retical hypotheses, and yet little has been done to supplement or 
replace the usual income-leisure analysis upon which most statis­
tical expectations are based. In the analysis to follow, we will be 
concerned with the development of a theoretical model and the 
derivation of implications regarding the labor supply relation. 
17 Before this, however, the next chapter will outline two recent 
theoretical contributions to consumer theory, and the possibility 
of departing from the assumption of the individual as the micro 
unit will be considered. 
18 III. NEW DIRECTIONS 
The standard approach to developing a labor supply relation is by 
way of a consumer-oriented micro model in which a fixed time 
period is allocated between "labor" and "leisure" in a manner 
that maximizes utility; the analysis assumes a positive price for 
time. Straightforward examples of this analysis are provided in 
[14, pp. 23-24 and 20, pp. 31-34] . This analysis has been subject 
to sharp criticism on the grounds that it requires a person to 
"consume" both income and leisure to gain utility and it requires 
that all consumers work, i.e., interior solutions are demanded by 
the analysis. Two recent and imaginative contributions to the 
theory of consumer behavior promise to alter the general treat­
ment of this area; one of these offers immediate application to 
the problem at hand. In this chapter, these recent works will be 
reviewed in order to establish familiarity with the approach to be 
adopted in the analysis to follow. Following this, the question of 
the relevant micro unit will be raised. 
Two Recent Developments in Consumer Theory 
To the noneconomist the theory of consumer behavior that has 
dominated the economic literature for the last 100 years must 
undoubtedly appear overly restrictive in  its assumptions and 
grossly expensive in analysis, given the limited number of mean­
ingful theorems it generates. This writer has heard physical scien­
tists scoff at the idea of individuals obtaining "utility" directly by 
consuming market goods. It  is certain that a similar response 
would follow the careful illustration that the theory requires in 
its standard-treatment, interior (i.e., positive) solutions in com­
modity space. Yet, we should not minimize the importance of the 
hypothesis of negative substitution effects. Nor should we im­
pune the originators and purveyors of the theory, as major 
theoretical advances seem to depend intimately on the develop­
ment of new analytical techniques, and the calculus has been the 
major tool in most of the last century. But, new analytical 
techniques have been forthcoming, and scholars are probing the 
intellectual frontiers of this field. Two recent and structurally 
similar advances in the area of consumer theory were provided in 
1965 by Gary Becker [3] and in 1966 by Kelvin Lancaster [18]. 
By preference and for continuity, the latter's work will be dis­
cussed first. 
19 The major shortcomings of the conventional consumer theory to 
which Lancaster responds pertain to its total rigidity with respect 
to the introduction of new commoditiesa continuing phenome­
non in a dynamic economy-and its inflexible  definition of con­
sistent behavior, namely, its inability to handle intrinsic proper­
ties in commodities and hence its prohibition on rational in­
dividuals from consuming one good at one time and another good 
at a different time. In relation to this latter shortcoming, Lan­
caster says: 
Thus, the only property which the theory can build on is 
the property shared by all goods, which is simply that they 
are goods [18, p. 132] , 
After recognizing that his approach is not completely original but 
has been suggested in part and implicitly or explicitly elsewhere, 
Lancaster develops a model departing from the conventional in 
several important respects. First, he suggests  that individuals do 
not consume market goods, xj, directly. Rather, market goods are 
combined through a "technology" matrix to yield consumption 
"activities," yk. These activities are transformed through another 
matrix to yield "characteristic" vectors, zi. It is the zi that people 
consume directly and, via a utility function, U(Z), on which they 
attempt to maximize their utility. In vector and matrix form, 
Lancaster's model is expressed as: 
Maximize	  U(Z) 
s.t.	  px=k 
with	  By = z 
Ay = x 
x,y,z > 0,  [18, p. 136]  . 
Recognizing the computational difficulties involved in such a 
(nonlinear programming) model, Lancaster makes some simplify­
ing assumptions regarding the number of elements in x, y, and z, 
and regarding the character and rank of A and B, and proceeds to 
build his model within a linear programming framework. After 
considering the effect of price changes and efficient choices, he 
proceeds to the labor-leisure analysis. 
20 Labor, or work activities, is treated as it would be in an input-
output model, i.e., as entering the model with a negative sign and 
hence using up characteristics. The analogy here in conventional 
theory is the treatment of labor so as to yield negative marginal 
utility. Again, in a simplified version of the model, it is shown 
that the wage rate determines the efficient combinations of work 
and consumption activities, given other prices and the technolo­
gies. 
This description need not be carried further. Although the full 
implication of Lancaster's model has not been realized, it seems 
clear that  it  will  influence the treatment of conventional 
consumption theory. The approach does offer relief from some 
historically binding restrictions in this area of theory and poten­
tially offers to yield meaningful hypotheses if some refinement 
can be achieved in the definition of a "characteristic" or the 
determination of the relevant technology matrixes can be re­
alized. 
Gary Becker may have developed a more useful model to the 
extent that it relies on one less transformation than does Lan­
caster's, is not hindered by the task of defining characteristics, 
and, most important for the present analysis, it includes time as a 
resource explicitly in the model without regarding work as yield­
ing negative marginal utility. Although much similarity exists 
between the Becker and Lancaster models, it is because of these 
last three differences that a modification of the Becker analysis 
will be developed below. But first, what is the Becker model? 
Becker's break with conventional theory is along two lines. First, 
he attempts to show, contrary to the usual treatment, that 
production and consumption are integrated at the level of the 
micro unit. Individuals or households are actually "small fac­
tories" in that they combine resources (raw material, capital 
goods, labor, etc.) to produce useful commodities. Second, in this 
production-consumption process, the micro unit's primary re­
source is time in that time is involved in both sides of this process 
as well as imposing an absolute stock constraint on the process, 
and hence the cost of time should be recognized explicitly in our 
theory. That is, the opportunity cost of time must affect the 
terms of trade between production and consumption and there­
21 fore between work and nonwork,  Since all of one's time is 
allocated either to consumption or to work, it  is clear that 
anything that affects total consumption time will affect, resid­
ually, work time, i.e., in the aggregate, the supply of labor. 
Formally, as stated in "A Theory of the Allocation of Time" [3, 
pp. 495-4991, the Becker model has the following form: Indi­
viduals or households do not consume market commodities di­
rectlyat least these commodities do not directly enter the utility 
function. Rather, market goods and time are combined through a 
production function into commodities, Zi = J, fx1,7.1). The Zi give 
rise to utility through the utility function, U =U(Zi  .  Zm). 
Becker talks in terms of the household and says it  is their 
problem to maximize U subject to a resource constraint which is 
made up of both an income and a time constraint. Wheremmar­
ginal and average prices are equal, this constraint appears as,E rriZi 
= V + T. Here, rri is the sum of direct and indirect expenses per 
unit of Zi, while T is the total time vector, IT is the relevant wage 
vector, and V is the sum of "other" income. Given appropriate 
assumptions regarding U, the first-order conditions for a con­
strained maximum can be derived, and they are, in appearance, 
identical to the conventional conditions. Some modification is 
required when marginal and average prices are not equal. 
Becker proceeds to discuss the various applications of the model, 
and he considers the effects of changes in other income, V, and in 
the wage vector, ir),  first. Regarding changes in V, he points out 
that working time would vary inversely unless the commodity set 
contained a number of inferior goods (i.e., goods for which 
az.  0) and these goods happened to be relatively time inten­
a v 
sive. As for the effect of a change in 7, on time worked, Becker 
recognized that this depends on the relative strength of the 
I The reference to nonwork in place of leisure is intentional. The 
latter term carries a positive connotation and implies the exist­
ence of a negative disposition of time, i.e., labor. The connotation 
is not desired. Given one's tastes for consumption activities,
which use time and income, and the total available time, the level 
or scale of consumption actually achieved will  depend, in large 
part, on a trade-off of time for income; no assumption regarding
the character of one disposition of time over another is required. income and substitution effects, assuming that relative time inten­
sities of commodities vary.2 
In terms of its relation to the objectives of this analysis, further 
summary is not required. Without doubt Becker's model, like 
Lancaster's, constitutes a major contribution to micro theory and 
promises to yield operationally meaningful theorems. Its major 
positive aspects seem to be: (1) its recognition of the complex 
nature of consumption; (2) the explicit recognition of time op­
portunity costs as a relevant variable in  all micro economic 
decisions; and (3) the ready adaptability of the model to a 
nonlinear programming format under a modified set  of 
assumptions and definitions; this flexibility allows for correction 
of what this writer feels is an important shortcoming of the 
model in its present form. 
As Becker developed the model in his 1965 article, the problem 
characterized may be described as a classical optimization prob­
lem, Such problems, while often yielding useful qualitative infor­
mation and lending themselves to analysis with the calculus, have 
the shortcoming of requiring interior solutions in the domain set, 
i.e., the necessary conditions cannot prevail if a solution vector 
contains elements at zero. The (implicit) assumption of interior 
solutions has long been awkward to rationalize, but so long as the 
calculus was the primary tool of analysis little could be done to 
dispose of this anachronism. In the framework of nonlinear 
programming, however, no such assumption regarding the solu­
tion vector is required. 
The Question of the Micro Unit 
Two other problems arise in the Becker model in its original 
form. These pertain to the question of the relevant micro unit 
and the character of the dependence within the unit if it is larger 
than an individual. Becker, again, referred to the household, but 
then expressed the relevant utility  function  as, U = 
U(Zi .  .  Zm). In this form, however, and without further 
qualification, the intimation is toward a family utility function of 
a very general form. It is so general, in fact, that many unanswer­
2This last point (i.e., the effect of IT) will receive considerable
emphasis later in the analysis, and Becker's answer here will be 
criticized as invalid. 
23 ed questions appear to have been sidestepped. Some of these 
questions relate to the assumed character of intrafamily relations 
for,  it should be pointed out, whatever assumptions are made 
here bear heavily on our ability to derive analytical statements 
pertinent to the very core of this analysis, i.e., whether income 
changes brought about by, among other things, unemployment 
can be expected to lead to changes in the labor force participa­
tion rate. These problems will now be considered. 
While noted economists like Debreu [5, p. 50] and Becker (noted 
above) have alluded to the "family" or "household" as the 
relevant micro unit, analysis of consumer demand has proceeded 
to consider the behavior of individuals. The reason for this, of 
course,  lies in the knotty problem of making interpersonal 
comparisons of the utility which is involved in the assumption of 
a joint welfare function. Recall, now, in Richard Rosett's study 
of "Working Wives  .  .  .," mentioned above, the model made use 
of a "family" utility function, U = U(Y,P). However, the struc­
ture of the model made the function essentially the wife's. Yet, 
the family does, on the basis of casual empiricism, seem to be the 
appropriate micro unit. Sociologists are convinced of this as 
evidenced by a recent collection edited by Nye and Berardo 
[22] .  One chapter, essentially an historical survey, discussed the 
"Economic Framework for Viewing the Family"  [22,  pp. 
223-268] .  Yet, the analytical problems remain. Fortunately, a 
partial solution has been suggested by Paul Samuelson. 
Samuelson, in his 1956 article on "Social Indifference Curves" 
[24] ,  while denying the possibility of such curves, admits that 
the "fundamental unit on the demand side is clearly the family." 
He goes on to recognize "discernible decentralization" in the 
family decision-making process, although the well-being of any 
single family member is related to the group. Thus, the family 
utility or social welfare function might be expressed as: 
u= Ffu,(xi  xm),  (x1  xm),... u (x1...xm)] 
aF n and assuming -> 0 for all i.  It is recognized that 1 
at/1 
if children are represented in F, then they must be rather "ma­
ture," i.e., they act rationally. This particular framework allows 
for what Samuelson calls quasi-independence in family decisions. And the generality of the expression does seem to allow, through 
F, for joint or consensus decisions. 
The problem is to maximize U  .  . Un) assuming F is L  . . 
aF continuous and - > 0 for all i and that there is a joint family
a income, I which coui nstrains the problem. In this framework the 
primary joint task of the family is the intrafamily allocation of 
income. And Samuelson points out in this regard that arithmetic 
or arbitrary rules of income allocation are generally incompatible 
with the maximization of a function like F. Due to the very 
nature of the problem (and particularly to the assumption that 
aF  > 0), there is the implication that "income must always be
a u, 
reallocated among the members of our family society so as to 
keep the 'marginal social significance of every dollar' equal" [24, 
p. 11] .  That is, the ratio of the marginal utility of income (as 
derived through family consensus) for family members must 
equal unity. Any departure from this implies that income can be 
reallocated such that a dollar spent by some family member will 
increase family utility more at the margin than is lost by taking a 
dollar from some other member. What this points up, according 
to Samuelson [cf., 24, pp. 13-14] , is that (1) any distribution of 
income  cannot  be  once-and-for-all;  and  (2)  the  original 
distribution must be determined with the  final equilibrium 
configuration in mind. Samuelson says this calls for a system 
providing for lump-sum intrafamily transfer of income, i.e., if F is 
to be maximized, some functional relation must exist to provide 
for an income distribution which satisfies the equality of marginal 
utility  of the  income condition mentioned above.  Before 
proceeding, please note that, by itself, this last proposition is not 
a value judgment, but it  is required by the character of the 
problem. The implications of this restriction will be considered in 
some detail below. 
Given  the  analytical  difficulties  of  handling  social  wel­
fare  functions,  the  framework just  considered seems par­
ticularly  appropriate  for  a  starting  point  in  analyses of 
the  labor  supply  question.  In  this  area  the  relevant  de-
cision-making unit does appear to be the family. Some of the 
recent labor economics texts, like Lester or Chamberlain, are 
paying lip service to this proposition. However, empirical studies 
25 (like those alluded to above) of factors affecting the aggregate 
labor supply have either focused on the aggregate participation 
rate or, if they dealt with the separate components of the  labor 
supply, proceeded as if each component were independent of any 
other. This seems a gross oversimplification and it is one of the 
primary objectives of the analysis below to take explicit, if 
partial, recognition of the intrafamily dependence of labor  force 
participation decisions. IV. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 
In this chapter we will draw upon Gary Becker's model, outlined 
above, in the hope of generating answers to the kind of questions 
in which we have indicated an interest. In particular, we hope to 
clarify the old controversy between the "encouraged worker" and 
"discouraged worker" hypotheses. As a first approach to this 
task, we will attempt to apply the calculus to the Becker model as 
modified to incorporate the family as the micro unit. The Becker 
analysis was expressed in terms of continuous functions and, for 
the purposes at hand, the implications of this assumption should 
be reviewed. Following this, the model will be approached from a 
programming perspective. In particular, a nonlinear programming 
model will be developed in an effort to derive possible empirical 
implications regarding the relation between time allocation and 
income changes. 
Drawing upon the Samuelson analysis expressed  in  "Social 
Indifference Curves" [24], the Becker model can be applied to a 
family. A family will be defined as consisting of m individuals 
(and In may equal 1) bound together by any sort of legal or 
extralegal  ties and attempting to maximize a family utility 
function. For simplicity of exposition in the analysis, we shall 
assume m = 2. The family ordinal utility function is, 
( 1 )  U= F[Ui(Zi), U2(Z1)1,k = 1, 2. 
As in Samuelson's suggestion outlined above, we recognize some 
degree of intrafamily decentralization in decision-making; there­
aF fore we assume  > 0 for all k (again, in this case k runs from
aUk 
1 to 2 but in general runs to m). 
The usual assumptions regarding Uk are: (1) Uk is a concave 
single valued increasing function over the domain of Zi and 
a2 Uk 
0; and (2) Uke C2; that is, the Uk have continuous
aziazi 
second partial derivatives with respect to Zj. Without making any 
27 restrictive assumptions on the character of F except that it is an 
increasing monotone transformation on the Uk, by making the 
usual assumptions about Uk we can say that FeC2 on Z1.1 
The Uk are a function of the Z1, where 
(2)  Zj = fj(x  xgi;  T1  .  Ti.j) j = 1  .  . n. 
In (2) the elements x are market commodities required in the 
production of Zj. We will denote the whole set of market 
commodities required for Zj as a vector, xj; hence xj is a subset of 
the universal  set  of market commodities, X.  Similarly, the 
elements, Thj, are components of the time set required for Zj; we 
will denote this in vector form as Tj and will recognize that the 
components of Tj may not apply to consecutively running hours 
since the production and consumption of some Zj may require 
preparatory efforts involving time. Equation (2) can be written, 
1 . (2')  Zj = fj(xjTj), j =  .  . n. 
If it was not clear in the summary of the Becker model provided 
above, the Zj are not commodities per se. They are consumption 
activities (or processes) which, in most cases, involve market 
commodities in some combination and time. Examples of such 
activities range from an income intensive evening out for dinner 
at a fine restaurant where the market inputs include the food and 
atmosphere purchased as well as some portion of the services of 
the family automobile and the use of one's finer attire, such an 
activity is not regarded as equivalent to a quick stop at the local 
drive-in.  Another example worth mentioning might  be an 
unemployed worker playing pool for an afternoon. This involves 
minimal market expenditures but is time intensive. 
There is a "technology" governing the production of the Zj; this 
is recognized in the fi . Assuming the production technology of (2') 
is linear, we can say: 
I The assumptions we wish to avoid are that F is simply  the sum 
of the Uk or any other particular form. Also the assumption that 
F e C2 will be later weakened to F c Cl. 
28 (3)  x = b.Z 
Tj  = tiZi, 
where, again, xi and Tj are column vectors on the left and bj and 
ti are vectors on the right of technical coefficients, while Z1 is a 
scalar. To this point, except for the focus on the family as 
opposed to the individual, the model is as Gary Becker expressed 
it.  In searching for the empirical implications of this model, 
Becker mentioned the apparent adaptability to a programming 
framework. However, he proceeded to rely on geometry and the 
calculus, making some required simplifying assumptions in the 
process. For purposes of the present analysis, we will proceed on 
the same track in order to discern the implications of this 
approach. The development of a programming variant will follow. 
The Calculus Approach 
For both analytical convenience and acceptability of assump­
tions, assume that our individual utility functions are expressed as: 
1 . (4)  Ui = Ui (Zi), j =  j1 
U2 = U2(Zd,  = j1+1  in 
This breakdown in notation is sufficiently general and yet permits 
our pointing out, e.g., a particular pair of Zj, one entering U1 and 
the second entering U2, may, for all intents and purposes, be the 
"same" activity. This, of course, implies that the production 
technologies, fj, for a common activity may be different between 
family members. But, this is as it should be; we have no reason to 
believe that it requires the same expenditure of time for father to, 
say, read the evening paper as it would mother, although market 
expenditures may be equal. 
The family's problem is to maximize (1), but since we assumed 
3 u  > 0  this is tantamount to maximizing (5) if the budget
a Uk 
constraints are independent. For the first family member we 
would have, 
29 Ul(ZI, Z2 ... Z11) to be maximized (5) 
s.t. 
(6)  E p jxj =  )(1 + g1 + w iTwi 
and 
Ti = Tel = TI (7)  I
jt
1 =1 
Here, T, Tc, Tw, pi, and w1 are all interpreted as vectors. Ti = 
total time, Tel = consumption time, Twi = working time, pj = 
prices appropriate for xi, and w1 = the relevant wage vector for 
the  first  family member. Y1 and gi  are "intrafamily income 
transfer" and "other income," respectively. 
Regarding these definitions, more explanation is required. Both 
Ti and Twi are treated as vectors in the same manner as Ti 
because there are both qualitative and economic differences in 
consuming or working during one interval during the day or week 
rather than another. That is, while the sum of the components in 
Ti equals 24 hours if we are dealing in days or 168 if our time 
period is a week, it may be more costly to indulge one's self in 
consumption between, say, the hours of eight and five on a 
weekday rather than in some other interval. The vehicle through 
which we determine the indirect costliness of consumption is w1; 
this is a vector of wage rates which is regarded as applying to the 
components of  T1  and therefore  has the same number of 
components as Ti . This vector,  wi, reflects the fact that, for any 
set of personal and skill characteristics of an individual, the wage 
rate applicable for prime weekday hours is likely greater than for 
Sunday or "after-hour" times when one could occupy himself at 
a "secondary" job. Becker points out the necessity of recognizing 
"productive consumption" in this model, i.e., sleeping, eating, 
and so forth. He suggests that for commodities such as these the 
"opportunity cost of time  is  less because these commodities 
indirectly contribute to earnings" [3, p. 503] . That is, failure to 
30 recognize the need for productive consumption in some, perhaps 
physiologically determined, magnitude will tend to lower the 
components of wk ultimatelyprudence and rationality require 
some consumption. 
Equation (6) is the goods constraint for the first family member. 
In (6),  I
j 
pixi is the sum of expenditures on market goods by
i=i 
the first family member which is equal to the sum Y1 = transfer 
income received by the first family member from other members, 
g1 = any "other" (nonwage) income received by this member, 
and w1 7',1 = the wage income of this member. An important 
assumption is implied in this constraint. The parameter Y1  is,
again, the net  transfer income received by the  first  family 
member. Therefore, we are assuming that the family has a 
method for optimally allocating joint family income among 
family members.2 The parameter Yk need not be positive for 
each k then, i.e., Yk  0 would indicate an amount transferred 
from k to other family members. We do know, defining 
lk = Yk+ gk+wrkTwk 
2  2 
(8)  = I ( Yk + gk +wiTwk)= total family income. k-1  k=i 
Constraints (6) and (7) are not independent and, following 
Becker [3, pp. 496 -4971, let us combine these into one. Solving 
for Twk in (7) and substituting in (6) we get: 
(9)  E p;xi + w1  7.1-= Yk + gk + wkT. 
From (3) we can write (9) as: 
(10)  E (p)1)/ +  ti)Zi = Yk  gk  wk Tk = 
Where the components of wk are constant, Becker terms this 
constraint "full income "[cf., 3,pp.497-4981, which is supposedly 
2 This assumption is rather casually inserted here. However, recall­
ing Samuelson's discussion on the requirements for income alloca­
tion necessary to discuss the maximization of a function like
U = F(U1  .  .  .  Um ),  further elaboration on this point is de­
manded and will follow. 
31 the maximum money income achievable. For the  kth  family 
member the ultimate constraint is: 
(11)  Sk(Zi) = Yk + gk + WkTk E (pibi + wkti)Zi= 
In  order to continue developing this variant, an important 
observation  and  an assumption are required at  this  point. 
Constraint (11) was derived from (6) and (7) by way of (3). But 
let us consider (7) as an inequality (i.e., /Ti< Tk) then, using 
(3), express (6) and (7) as EpibiZi = Y k  gk +  T,,,k and 
EtiZi < Tk. Provided both of these constraints are binding, an 
optimal  solution must occur on the subset  of (6)  in  the 
intersection of (6) and (7). However, in (11) there is no assurance 
that this condition will be satisfied. 
Becker recognized the problem of requiring EtiZi < Tk;  he 
says at one point "I assume for simplicity that the amount of 
each dimension of time used in producing commodities is less 
than the total available .  .  ." so that this problem can be ignored 
[cf., 3, n. 2, p. 4981. This can be partially rationalized on the 
basis of the recognized necessity for productive consumption; yet 
we must observe that an assumption like this is something less 
than desirable. Becker goes on to suggest that the incorporation 
of /tiZi < Tk is not difficult; this is true, but, as will be shown 
by way of the  programming variant,  the implications are 
somewhat different than if we assume that time constraints are 
satisfied. In addition, as will be shown below, proceeding by way 
of the calculus effectively reduces this assumption to ZtiZi <Tk, 
i.e., each family member works. Yet, as it is not the realism of the 
assumptions that makes a theory important but rather the degree 
to  which the  theory  permits  meaningful  interpretation of 
observed behavior, we will proceed to assume for the time being 
that, in (11),  Zwk tiZi < EwkTk. Unfortunately, (11) em­
bodies even more troublesome difficulties; these will be brought 
out below. 
3Two important assumptions are embodied in constraint (11).
First, (11) could be written as  a weak inequality indicating
possible saving. For the moment we shall assume a constant,
Keynesian-type marginal propensity to consume and consider the
"income" component of (11) as net spending income. Second, as
stated, the constraints are linear. Hence, average and marginal
prices are equal. This need not be retained and, if required,
nonlinear constraints can be introduced. 
32 Now, due to our definition of Yk and the character of the present 
problem, it should be clear that the constraints Sk(ZJ) are not 
independent. Only if the transfers, Yk, could be made on a 
once-and-for-all basis could the individual utility functions be 
maximized separately subject to the respective constraint. But, in 
the discussion of Samuelson's social indifference curve article, it 
was  indicated  that  if  the  problem  is  to  maximize 
au U = F(Ui,U2) and the assumption that  > 0 is made 
a Uk 
and there is no apparent reason not to assume thisthen a system 
providing  for  income  transfers,  Yk ,  so  as  to  keep 
au = aU  = constant, must be provided.  It is this require­
aI1  art 
mentand this one alone that provides any reason to believe 
that unemployment or income changes for one family member 
will have any effect on other family members. 
It  is now appropriate to consider the precise character of the 
problem facing the family. However, this requires a return to, and 
critical examination of, Samuelson's condition for a maximum of 
(1). For, while the equality of marginal utility of income of 
family members is a valid and necessary condition for a maximum 
of F when continuous functions are assumed, Samuelson's 
approach to this problem is excessively casual. His analysis will 
now be reviewed and the implications examined and criticized. A 
solution to the problem will then be suggested and incorporated 
in the family's problem. 
Again, "the fundamental unit on the demand side is clearly the 
`family' " [24,  p. 9] .  But, in western culture we do observe a 
certain intrafamily decentralization. Yet, "blood is thicker than 
water" and, 
.  . the preferences of different members are interrelated 
by what might be called a "consensus" or "social welfare 
function" which takes into account the deservingness or 
ethical worths of the consumption levels of each of the 
members. The family acts as if it were maximizing a joint 
welfare function [24, p. 10]. 
Assuming that each family member has his own ordinal utility 
indicator function,  u',  the joint  function can be expressed 
33 au
 
U = f (u`, u2  ...). Assuming  > 0, the model displays what 
Samuelson calls quasi-independence. By virtue of this quasi-inde­
pendence, Samuelson says: 
The only joint consensus decisions that have to be made by 
the  family have to do with the allocation among the 
different individuals of the total family income I. If this is 
properly broken down into I = It + 12 + .  .  ., then each 
member confronted with market prices (Px, Pp,...) can be 
counted on to maximize his own ordinal ul (Xi, Yi, _) and 
each will be led,  as  if by an invisible hand, toward 
maximization of U =  u2 ...) [24, p. 101. 
This joint allocation problem requires a system providing for the 
lump-sum transfers referred to above. For family income, I,  to 
be optimally allocated: 
Income must always be reallocated among the members of 
our family society so as to keep the "marginal social sig­
nificance of every dollar" equal, i.e., 
OU  au2 
au2  a/2  = 1, etc. [24, p. 111. 
au  au' 
au'  all 
It is suggested here that all that is required for a maximum of U is 
that income be reallocated through lump-sum transfers in a 
manner such that the above ratios are unity; the quasi-independ­
ent nature of the problem would do the rest. The manner for 
achieving this result is not outlined; however, it is pointed out 
that  these transfers cannot be once-and-for-all and must be 
performed with the final equilibrium configuration in mind. The 
rub in this whole problem lies in the implied two-stage approach. 
That is, allocate income, I, among I' such that the above ratios are 
satisfied, then let each member maximize his own utility function 
subject to his own constraint. Yet, consider the partial derivatives 
au  au' aui  and hence  .  ar 
By way of the standard treatments of consumer theory (and this 
34 would include the Becker and Lancaster approaches), income 
does not enter directly into the utility function but contributes 
to  total utility by way of the commodities it  permits the 
consumer to consume. The marginal utility of income is the rate 
of change of total utility for marginal changes in income, and the 
relevant value of this  derivative  is  specified by the utility 
function, an optimal vector of commodities, and the respective 
aui  aui market prices, i.e.,  /  pi for some commodity
axl.
ai u index j over all j and with  evaluated at the optimal value of
ax; 
the commodity. Hence, the values of those partial derivatives, 
au  aui  in  Samuelson's equilibrium condition are not 
aui  aii 
specified until the optimal commodity vector is determined, 
which implies, for the present analysis, that the determination of 
the optimal income transfers and commodity vector must take 
place simultaneously. Fortunately, this is possible if proceeding 
with the calculus variant is warranted on other grounds. 
Because of the implications of the above consideration, it  is 
necessary to consider (8) as the relevant income constraint in the 
problem of maximizing U = F(U1,U2). By (8) and (10), total 
family income is: 
2 2 
(12)	  / = I ik =I (Yk +gk  wkT)=E (Pibi +
k=1  k=1  1=1 
From the  definition  of the intrafamily  transfers,  Yk, it  is 
m 
clear E Yk = 0. The presentation of (12) as the relevant 
k=1 
constraint is equivalent to regarding the family as having a joint 
checking account which is exhausted in each period on total 
expenditures, E (pibi + wkti)Zi. Family members are required to
J= 
draw upon the account in a responsible manner which leads to 
the maximum of F. And, on reflection, this does not seem to be a 
distortion of the way families behave in fact. In effect this says 
that the family is a collection of rational individuals who are 
aware, either intuitively or through discussion, of the restrictions 
35 posed by the household utility function and of the necessity for 
drawing on I in a manner such that some final equilibrium 
configuration is satisfied. 
The family's problem may be expressed as: 
(13) Maximize 
U  F(Ui, U2 ) = F[ Uk (Zi)J , k= 1,2 
S. t. 
2  2 2 2 
k(Zi)= E Yk  Egk + Ewk Tk  1(pib + wkt.)Z= 0 
k=1 
k = 1,2 j = 1  .  .  . n. 
In (13), pi, ti, b1, and  wk are vectors, as is Tk, where Tk = Twk 
Tck and Tck = EV/ over the appropriate interval of j. The 
vector T is now being subscripted, not to imply that the total 
time vectors are different but to suggest that each individual is 
subject to the constraint of a total time vector. As was expressed 
in (4), the index j is broken into two intervals, one interval for 
each family member. 
Since the assumptions we have made regarding the functions in 
(13) seem to permit, we will treat this as a classical optimization 
problem and proceed to form a Lagrangian function, 
2 
(14)  L(Z1, X ) = FI Uj (Zj),U2(Zi)1  LESk(Zj)l. 
Again, each Uk, Sk is defined over a particular interval of j. 
. To wit: j = 1  .  ji  for U1, Si 
j = /1+1  . . j for U2, S2 
With this proviso then, the familiar necessary conditions for the 
maximization of (14) are, 
36 (15)	  aF  au,
 
au,  az/ 
X7r
 
aF  au, 
ri1 
au,  azyi 
aF  a u2 
=  X7Tii +1 
a u2  az°1 + 1 
aF  au2 
N7rn 
au2  az°, 
2 2 2 
Yic  Igk  IwkTk  Z(Ci  wic'tj)Z;= O. 
Again, rrj = (ci  WO) is the sum of two scalar products. The 
superscript on the Zi now denotes the values of  for which 
these conditions hold. From (15) comes the two familiar prop­
ositions that the marginal rates of substitution equal the ratios of 
the "prices," aj, and the marginal utility of income, X,equals the 
ratio of the family marginal utilities, evaluated at Z1?, to the 
prices, 7Ti. 
The equations provided in (15) are the usual necessary conditions 
from which we would derive theoretical demand curves and the 
other qualitative statements regarding the effects of parameter 
changes. These conditions are intuitively attractive because the 
"prices," whose ratios we might consider in (15), consist of both 
the direct market expenditures and the indirect cost of time per 
unit of Z1. Yet, there are reasons to believe this outward attrac­
tiveness is oversimplified and deceiving. Consider the following: 
First, if a set, Z°, exists which satisfies (15) we know Zi > 0 for 
all j since the calculus can only lead us to an interior solution in 
37 activity space. Secondly, we know I tiZi = "total consumption 
I 
time" of all household members. However, we do not know 
anything of the relation between EtiZi and total family timz, 
and, more importantly, we know nothing of the relation between 
separate consumption times and the individual time constraints; 
clearly the hours of one family member are not substitutable for 
the hours of another member yet there is nothing in constraint 
(11) or (12) which prohibits substitution. A third, and similar, 
difficulty arises out of the specification of Tk as a vector with 
components of fixed size. In the discussion above we followed 
./1 
Becker in assuming, e.g., I t1Z1 < T1. But if we extend this 
assumption and apply it to each component of the Tk and it 
would have to be an assumption since there is nothing in the 
constraint nor in the calculus that assures satisfaction of the 
separate time constraintsthen, since the calculus provides only 
interior solutions, each family member is required to both 
consume and work during each interval of time. This is absurd. 
The essence of these remarks is  to say effectively that the 
combination of the expenditure and time constraints by way of 
the production technologies is misleading and the result, the full 
income constraint, (11) or (12), leads us to question the existence 
of even a feasible solution, not to mention an optimal solution. 
In spite of these difficulties, suppose we assume, for the sake of 
argument, that Z° is optimal and satisfies all the time con­
straintsall stock time constraints are satisfied in the aggregate 
and in terms of the separate components. Can the kind of 
empirical implications we are looking for (or any other kind) be 
drawn from the model? 
Since it is the effect of wage and/or income changes that has been 
our concern, let us confine the analysis to just such consider­
ations and apply the Slutsky analysis to (15). The set of equa­
tions, (15), provides the necessary conditions for a constrained 
maximum of family utility, and we have assumed that the sepa­
rate time constraints are not violated. On this assumption, then, 
jl
 
total consumption time of the two family members is, E  tiZi = 
= 
Ti and E tiZi = Tc2, respectively. Work time is found resid­
/ =11 +1 
38 ually in this case and is Tw1 = T1  Tc1 > 0 for the first 
family member and Tw2 = T2  Tc2 > 0 for the secondbut these 
concepts are vectors. Consider the set of equations derived by 
taking the total differential of (15). These are, 
(16)  Fi 1 dZi...+  7ri dX = Xdiri 
+ F,indZn -7rndX = Xd7rn 
Tri dZ  .  .  irndZn = H. 
In the last equation of (16), H = dI + Zdir. 
In (16) there are n + 1 linear equations in n + I unknowns, dZi 
and dX, but the coefficients of this system should be made clear 
before proceeding. The family utility function is, again, U = 
F[U1(Z1), U2(Z1)]. The total differential of this is, 
dU= FuidUi + Fu2dU2. 
But since 
I( 
dUi = U11dZ1  .  .  + U111dZ11 = I UljdZi 
i =1 
and 
dU2 = U211  dZji+1  ..+ U2 ndZn =  11.12idZi 
i=i1+1 
and where  U11 and U21 are first partial derivatives, dU becomes, 
it 
dU= Fui( j1 Ui.dZi)+ Fug( E U2jdZ1) 
i=i1+1 
Now,  d2Uls, 
d(dU)= Fu2  Fu1u2dU1dU2  Fu2u1dU2dU1 
+ F2 dU2d U2 . u 2 
39 The family utility function, F, embodies the interrelatedness of 
family satisfactions. However, we, like Samuelson, assumed a 
degree of intrafamily independence in decision making; this 
amounts to assuming that the middle two terms of d2U are zero, 
i.e., F  2d U  Fuiu 2dU2dU 1= O. This being the case, d2U 
breaks down to, 
2 d
2 U  Fu2 idUidUi  Fu2dU2dU2 
h h  a2u
 
= Ft2,  E  I  dZjdZr
 





dZjdZr, j,r  1  .  .  .  /7. +F(2,2  . 1=11 + 1  r=ji+iaZiaZr 
As an example and assuming j and r = 1, the notation in (16) 
a2 U1 
is F1 1 = Fu21  . In matrix and vector form (16) appears 
aZ? 
as, 
_-11  F111  0  0  dZ1  Xdir1 
F111  0  0 -rt 
Fi1 -F1i1 +1  -7r1 1+1 
0  0  F0114_1  Fnn  -7rn  dZ  Xdrr 
-71  -17"1  /  0  (1X  11 
If we define A as the matrix of coefficients in (16' ), dZ as the 
vector of differentials consisting of the differentials dZi and dX., 
and letting 0 represent the right side of (16.), we have, 
(17)  AdZ =e. 
40 The matrix, A, is a bordered Hessian matrix of order n + 1. 
Assuming IA1* 0, we can solve for dZ thusly: 
(18)  AlAdZ = A-10 
dZ = S10­
For any particular differential in (18), e.g., dZ 1  we would obtain 
an expression of the form, 
2 2 
Di id7r1 +  + X-Dmnd7rn +Dn +1.1 (-EdYk- Edgk (19)  dZ1 = 
1A1 
ZWkdT TdEwk + Z°d7r 
2 2 
IAI 
where D is the appropriate cofactor from A. 
A 
We are interested in the sign of aZ / /a'k where, again,/k = Yk 
gk + wkT. Total income,  can change due to changes in other 
income, gk, or in the wage "rate,"  wk. To obtain these effects it 
is necessary to "jolt" the equations like (19) by changing gk or 
wk.  It is at this juncture where the final breakdown comes in 
the application of the calculus to the model at hand because, due 
to the specification of the model, some of the necessary differ­
entials emerge as vectors. It is possible to obtain, e.g., from (19), 
az the partial derivative --I by following the usual procedure of 
agl 
holding other differentials to zero and varying g1. The result 
would be, 
az,  Dn+1.1 (20) 
ag1  16,1 
This is the pure income effect whose sign is indeterminant be­
cause the cofactor in the numerator is unsigned. However, using 
(19) as an example again, consider what happens when we 
attempt to differentiate dZ1 with respect to w1 . 
From the definitions above, w1 was specified a vector because 
there apparently is a difference in the way firms value the time of 
individuals with various job-skill profiles in various times of the 
day or week. If we attempt to differentiate dZ1 with respect to 
w1 we are, then, differentiating a scalar with respect to a vector; 
41 the result is a vector and would have no meaning for the purposes 
for which it is being derived. That is, because of the structure and 
concepts of the model, the primary result required in order to 
observe the effect on consumption or work time of changes in the 
wage vector is not meaningful. The analytical sacrifices we were 
willing to accept by assuming that Z° satisfied the time con­
straints turn out not to be helpful after all. 
Gary Becker's integration of production and consumption at the 
micro level and in a manner that incorporates time as the primary 
scarce resource must be regarded as a contribution to the body of 
theoretical literature in economics. However, this innovation, 
along with the specification of the family as the micro unit, has 
sufficiently complicated the analysis so the calculus is not a 
useful tool for extracting the implications in which we are in­
terested. Should we simplify the model to the point where this 
tool would be applicable, we would be back to an individual-
oriented, single-wage, single-time-period model that still requires 
the individual to work and, in addition, still requires the assump­
tion that the time constraint is not violated. In order to take 
meaningful advantage of Becker's contribution and to emphasize 
the role of time allocation, a programming framework is required. 
The Allocation and Programming Variant 
The observations above have pointed out the necessity of 
approaching a problem of the type we have formulated with an 
analytical tool other than the calculus. More specifically, the 
character of the problem invites a programming perspective and 
nonlinear programming in  particular.  In  this section a pro­
gramming version of this modified Becker model will be devel­
oped; the objective is to discern the theoretical differences in the 
model's implications as compared to the calculus model. Return 
now to equations (1), (2'), (3), and assumption (4). We have: 
(1)  U= F1U (Zi), U2 (Z/)1 
(2')  Zj=  .11(xj,Ti), j = 1  . 0 . . 
(3)  xi = b./Z./ 
Tj= tjZi 
(4)  U1 =  (Zi), j = 1  . 
U2 = U2 (Zi), 1 =11+1  .  .  .  n. 
42 Regarding (1) we only need assume now Fe Ci , i.e., F has con­
tinuous first partial derivatives. However, this does not exclude 
the possibility that FeC2. Also, the Uk and F are assumed to be 
concave. Each activity, Zi, involves unit market expenditures 9 = 
p1b1, where pi and bj are vectors of market prices and tech­
nological coefficients, respectively. The market budget constraint 
facing an individual would be, then, 
(21)  ECiZi-wkTwk =8k. 
The time constraint for each family member is 
n 
(22)  E tjZj + Twk G Tk. 
This inequality, (22), needs some explanation. It says, in effect, 
that consumption time plus work time must not exceed but may 
fall short of total time. This latter contingency may seem strange 
for  it  recognizes that one may consume "pure leisure," i.e., 
consume time only and no market commodities. In terms of a 
programming framework this is recognized as slack in the time 
constraint in which case time is a free good. However, from the 
definition of the consumption activities, there  is nothing to 
preclude some Zj from involving time only and no market com­
modities, in which case Z1 is "pure leisure" and enters the utility 
function. On this basis constraint (22) would always be an 
equality and time would not possibly be a free good. In addition, 
all references to time, such as tj, Twk, etc., are now recognized as 
scalars. 
Let us now recognize that each family member probably has 
several occupational choices potentially open to him or her and a 
wage rate is associated with each occupation. The time spent in 
each occupation is variable; we will denote these times and wage 
rates as T ks and wks, respectively. In terms of the present 
model the family's problem can now be expressed as, 





E t1Z1 +ET1s =T1
 
j= 1 
43 and hence, 
T,XlT°----- 0 
vt,,11(Z,T,,X)7t= 0 
where, e.g.,  , V(Z,T,,,,,X) is the gradient vector  of the Lagran­
gian function with respect to the Zi. In addition, we know from 
the Kuhn-Tucker conditions that 
aV(V,T,,,,  0 or X = 0 for Xk and X3 
ax 
and therefore v x V(Z, Tv,X)X° = 0. 
The immediate questions that emanate from consideration of 
(24) are, first, what is the economic interpretation of the X and, 
second, what are their dimensions in the present problem? Had-
ley, again, provides our frame of reference. 
In [12, pp. 72-731  it  is pointed out that the Z° and ?° are, in 
general, functions of G = g1 +g2 and Tk. On the assumption that 
Z° and X° are continuous functions of G and Tk in some e 
neighborhood of G* and Tic* , values generating e and e, Hadley 
shows that: 
aF[uk(z° )1_  o  aFtukre  0  6 x3 and  X° k 
dTk 
That is, X°3 is the rate of change of the family concensus function 
with respect to income, ceteris paribusit is the marginal utility 
of income for the family. Also, n is the rate of change of family 
Technically, the primal variables and the Lagrange multipliers
are functions of whatever appears on the right  side of the 
constraints; in the present case, as now stated, this is C and the 
Tk. 
6 At another point Hadley shows [12, p. 1991 that the existence 
aF[Uk(Z°
of, e.g.,  is intimately related to the satisfaction
aG 
of the Kuhn-Tucker constraint qualification and the rank of the
matrix of first partial derivatives of the constraints with respect 
to Z, and Tks. 
46 utility with respect to the kth time constraintit is the (weight­
ed) marginal utility of nonwork time of the kth family member. 
More on this point will follow presently. 
Consideration of the dimensions of Xi( and X3 is the next topic of 
analysis. We could develop analytical expressions for X°k andX3 by 
relying on the proof of Hadley [12, pp. 64-65] involving the 
implicit function theorem. This proof demonstrates that one can 
take, in this case, and three rows from (25) for positive variables, 
and, if the Jacobian implicit to those equations is nonsingular, 
unique  expressions  for  the  multipliers,X,  can be obtained. 
However, we can proceed by another tack that implicitly relies on 
the Hadley proof. That is, if an optimal solution vector, Z°, exists 
to our problem (23), the Kuhn-Tucker conditions expressed in 
(25) can be regarded as a linear programming problem in the 
differentials of the	  Lagrangian  function. Since the marginal 
a th, -- ,are constants at Z` , this problem amounts 
a Uk  az7 
Y7 finding values of X  ; X2, and X3 which minimizedR = dT 1+ d T2 
X2 + dGX3 subject to (25).7 
With these observations, let us make some simplifying assump­
tions and then proceed to consider the linear programming prob­
lem embodied in (25). Regarding the optimal conditions for the 
Tks, eg X1  WksX3  .- 0, since the first (each) family member 
has a set of possible occupational choices, there will be a cor­
responding set of conditions like these and, since X and X3 enter 
each condition, it is clear that if the wage rates, w s, differ, only 
one (if any) occupation will be chosen. This applies to the second 
member as well. Assume, for simplicity, that we know that for 
the second family member X2- w X > 0 for all occupationsthe 2s-3 
second member does not work in the present solution. And 
7 The reason that the differentials emerge here is to be found by
way of the Kuhn-Tucker constraint qualification  [cf., 12, pp. 
199-202] .  This qualification imposes some restrictions on the 
character of the feasible region surrounding Z° (if it exists). This
feasible region is confined to a neighborhood around Z° in the
intersection of the hyperplanes derived from the constraints and 
the  objective  function  and  that  pass  through Z °  these 
hyperplanes are expressed in differentials. Also, only if the
constraint qualification is satisfied (and the assumptions made in
the present model assure this) is a unique solution vector, 
guaranteed. 
47 assume that we know, for the first family member, that Xi 
w11X3 =0 and Xi  w 1 sX3 > 0 for all other occupationsthe first 
family member works in occupation number one. In addition, 
assume for convenience that the index j still runs from 1 to n and 
j I  still is the upper end of the index for the first family member. 
au  au If we denote, e.g., c'1  , the relevant linear pro­
gramming problem is:  aul  az7 
(26)  ti Xi + 0 + clX3 
X +0+9 X3 t /I  I
0 + t /1+1 X +C.  X  (I) 2  /1+1  3  /1+. 
0 + tnX2 + 
X1 -W11X3  = 0 
>0 X2  w2 1X3 
dT1X1 + dT2X2 + dGX3  = dR (minimum) 
,X2, X3 >0. 
The optimal vector for (26), X°, is a vector such that for the 
Lagrangian function in (24), 
V(Z,Tks,X°  V(Z °,ns,x0 )17(zo 
Solution procedures for (26) could proceed by way of adding n + 
2 additional (surplus) variables and an identity matrix of order n 
+ 2 to the constraints. However, it is clear that the inverse to the 
optimal basis would involve only three of the original rows of 
48 coefficients. Therefore, let us deal with the linear dual to (26).
This would be: 
(27)
 
t1dZ1  + thdZii  +dT1l <dT1
 
th+idZi 1+1  .  . .+ tndZi,  + 0  c/T2 
c dZ  + ciidZi  +cy +idZin  + endZn - w idTiidG 
cP1dZ7  .  . + 43. ic121 +(Di i÷ icIZY1+.1  + (1)ndZn° +0  =dU 
(max.) 
Z1  0; X/c, A3  0. 
The "prices" in the objective function, lj, are the relevant mar­
ginal utilities and are constant since they are evaluated at Z°. 
For purposes of viewing the dimensions of the X°, we can pick any 
nonsingular basis matrix, B, from (27) from indices  jeJ or Tks> 
0 and obtain values for these dual variables as follows: 
(28)  X"= 
where (13/B: is the vector of prices associated with the basis. Let us 
arbitrarily choose the columns of (27) associated with Z 1  Zn, 
and T1 1. he basis matrix is, 
(29) 
ti  0  1 
B=  0 to 0 
Cl  cri  W11 
and 
49 (30) 
wlltn  t 
0  -(C1 +w11t1) 0 
B- 1 
-tn(Ci+  tnei  -tlCn  tit 
By way of (28) we obtain the following: 
(31)  Xi  wii4)1  _ 
C1 +wilt!  rri 
w11X3 
enct.1-7r1(1),  (tin  CY/ 
X2  to (C. 1 -I-w1 1 ti)  to 
(13 (1)1 X3 
ci+wi ti 
In (31), the family marginal utility of income, X3, is the familiar 
ratio of activity marginal utilities to "total prices," irj, where this 
price includes both direct market expenditures and the indirect 
cost of time. For the second family member who is assumed not 
to work in the present solution, the marginal utility of time can 
be seen to be related to the family marginal utility of income and, 
hence, is not independent of the first member's utility function. 
For the first member who does work, the marginal utility of 
nonwork time is w11 X3. Let us now recognize the multipliers 
expressed in (31) as optimal values since the same kind of 
expression would be obtained for any other nonsingular basic 
matrix involving the column for T11. Certain post-optimality 
questions can now be raisedin particular, what is the effect of a 
change in w11'? Before proceeding, we should define certain 
analytical concepts that will prove helpful below. In the sub­
sequent analysis it  will be convenient to consider activities in 
terms of their "income intensiveness" or "time intensiveness" and 
some measure of these concepts is required. For this purpose,
t consider  ;  this has the dimensions units of time/8
+wl I tj 
and if this is "small" we would say Zi is of low time intensity; 
50 C 
t t conversely, if  is "large" (and the largest value it
ci+wi  ti 
could take is  1/w1  )  Z1 would be time intensive. Similarly, 





number and 0 <  < 1. If this ratio approximates 1, 
Ci+W l  1 ti 
Zi can be regarded as income intensive, while if it approximates 
zero, Z1 is of low income intensity. Of course, these are the 
extremes and intermediate possibilities exist. In the analysis be­
low it will be convenient to talk of activities as being time or 
income intensive. Also, it will be useful to refer to the ratio of 
i 
these two concepts; or, more simply,  This ratio represents
t- t 
dollar expenditures per unit of time in Zi and can be alluded to as 
being relatively large or relatively small. In addition and following 
the conventional calculus precedent, it will be convenient to refer 
to activities as being "normal" or "inferior." In the usual way, an 
activity is normal if an increase in income leads to an increase in 
consumption of the activity, while a decrease in income leads to a 
reduction in consumption. An inferior activity would display the 
opposite set of sign relations. It will not, however, be necessary to 
stipulate that Z° has any dominant character and, in fact, Z° can 
have both time-and income-intensive activities represented in it at 
positive levels. 
Consider a new wage rate applying to the first occupation; this is 
wit = wit+ O wti We can then consider the effects on (31) and 
the condition Al  w1 1 X3 = 0 of replacing wli by wri in (29). 
That is, 
(29 ) 
ti  1 0 
B= 0  to  O 
4* 
C  Cn 
and 
51 111  (30' )  -wlltn  Cn 
1  0 0 (ci+w 1 lt,i) (C +W *1 1 t 1 ) 
tn  -ti C,,  IlIn 
Suppose, initially, Owl 1 < 0 and wikl< w11. Then the optimal 
condition for T1 I  becomes X1  w i iX3 > 0 and if Ti 1  is to 
remain positive X3 must rise and/or Al must fall to restore 
equality in this condition. In the event Owl1 > 0, the opposite 
set of sign changes must take place. The new vector, X*, obtained 
when wit is replaced by w*1 I  is, 




(13n -cn  _  (13n  Cn(I) x; 




Before examining the individual elements of X* we must dispose 
of some potentially troublesome implications of changing an 
element in the assumed optimal basis matrix. First, such a change 
could make 1B*1 =0 and hence B71 would not exist; in the present 
case this could only happen if  w i 1 < 0 and [wi 1 ti ] = [ci ] , a 
possibility we need not consider. Secondly, it  is theoretically 
possible for such a change to require a nonfeasible solution. In 
the present case, again, this would mean a solution that violates 
the time constraints or the requirement Zj Tks  0; it would 
require w*li < 0 to lead to the last implication and it would 
seem to require "large" increases in w 11  to have the former 
52 constitute a problem. Thirdly, the potentially most troublesome 
implication of changing wit is that such a change might alter the 
optimality conditions in the primal. We shall consider this pres­
ently. 
In (32), if w*11 < wit  Awl 1 < 0) we observe the follow­
ing: 
I	  .  Xi'< X7, AXt< 0, and A?ci1 is  larger  the  more income 
intensive (i.e., the larger  is Z1. Since Al is related to 
nonwork time of the first family member and we have
assumed concave utility functions, 0X1 < 0 implies ATI 1 
< 0nonwork time increases. 
2.	  Jt2 < X02, AX2 < 0; changes in X2  are related to the first 
member's consumption set and are smaller the less time 
intensive is Z1 , i.e., the smaller 11--. 
1r1 
3.	  a3 > X3; AX3 > 0; the loss of wage income ceteris paribus 
raises the family marginal utility of income which is con­
sistent with what would be expected from the character of 
the utility functions. 
For sufficiently small changes in wti we observe from (32), X* 
= wri X; and Ti 1 remains positive but smaller. However, a change 
in the equilibrium condition for the time worked variable for the 
second family member may have occurred. Suppose w21 was the 
highest wage available for this family member; then the relevant 
condition in the optimal solution would have been X2 w21 X3> 
0. The effect of lowering w11 has been to increase X3 and 
decrease X2 which may make this condition zero and push the 
second member into the labor force. With no further consider­
ations, this amounts to a clear cut theoretical statement of the 
Woytinsky additional worker hypothesis. That is, negative wage 
changes to the employed primary labor force should, through the 
effect on the marginal utilities of time and income, push some 
additional ("secondary") workers into the labor force; with no 
changes in tastes, increases in wages should lead to withdrawal of 
some or all of those secondary workers. The hypothesis is broader 
than this, too; it says that either secondary members enter the 
labor force in order to maintain a stable family income or the 
demand for income-intensive commodities falls. 
53 This can be illustrated further. Consider Zj where 1 <j <j1 and 
je J, i.e., 4> 0. The optimal condition for Zj was, t1  cjX°3 = 
(1)j, After the change in w1 i and in terms of (32), the left side of 
this becomes tj(X7 + 0X1) + cj(X3 + AX3). It  is clear that the 
optimal condition for Z1 will remain an equality only if tj 4X1 + 
ci  AN, 
cjAX3 = 0; put otherwise, this  =  0X1  If  9  >  Zj
ti  AX3  tj  AN3 
must go to zero or at least decline; in this case Zj would be called 
normal and relatively income intense. On the other hand, if 11-< t 
-
AXI, there would be forces operating to increase Z- and, in this 
AX3 
case, Z1 would be referred to as being inferior and of relatively 
low income intensity or relatively time intense. For jeJa similar 
set of arguments holds. That is, for Zj in which je J and the 
ci  AN' 
optimal condition was t1X1 + cjX3 > 14)- if  >  ,  Zj
ti  AX3 
remains at zero and would behave as a normal activity. On the 
AX,
other hand, if --=-<  Z- may go positive and display the t  AX3 
inferior quality. For Zj in which /1+1 < j < n, the same argu­
ments pertain since 0X2 < 0 (as was 0X1) and AX3 > 0 for 
< 0. The source of these effects on the activity set is,  Aw 1 1 
again, changes in w 1  (for the present case) which affect the 
relevant marginal utilities and hence affect the optimal conditions
(­ for the Zj. Any particular effect depends on the ratio  in 
relation to, e g ,	 
AX 1  We have seen that where wages are 
AX3 
reduced and where 71-- ,  is larger than 
AX1 
, Zj  either re-
it 
mains at zero or is reduced and possibly to zero; such activities 
can be regarded as  relatively income intensive, A perfectly 
symmetrical counter argument holds for increases in wages. 
The implied possible effects of wage changes on the optimal 
conditions in the activity set rings a familiar tone. That is, falling 
wages and income lead to reduced consumption of  income-inten­
sive activities-the "income effect" here implies that such ac­
tivities are normal in the usual sense of the term. Conversely, 
falling wages and income lead to increased consumption of time­
54 intensive activitiesthe "income effect" is negative and implies 
that such activities are inferior in the usual sense and there is 
nothing in the assumptions underlying Uk and F which preclude 
the presence of inferior activities. Another, and perhaps better, 
way of describing the effects just observed is to say that activities 
with "large" SI become relatively expensive, while those with ti 
"small" L become relatively inexpensive, and the implied direc­
t. 
tion of adjustment is just what we would expect. 
Before terminating this discussion on the effects of wage changes, 
let us pursue one more thread. Rather than confine the assumed 
wage change to w 1,  it might be worth while to consider the 
effects of a "general" wage change. That is, what if both wit and 
w2 i (w k s in general) change uniformly? 
Begin by assuming that an optimal solution exists for a problem 
like (23); in the Kuhn-Tucker conditions of (25) there is a set of 
activities, je J  that enter Z° positively and a second set, je J. 
which enters Z° at the zero level. In addition, assume Al w 1 1 X3° 
= 0, and X°2  W 2 I X3 > 0the first family member works in the 
first occupation and the second member does not work for pay. 
In the initial equilibrium the vector, X°, is defined as in (31). 
Now, suppose there is a negative uniform wage change for all 
occupations. In this case, even if the wage change did not alter 
the optimal conditions (i.e., the Kuhn-Tucker conditions), we 
would observe the same changes in A as are expressed in (32). 
That is, AX1 < 0, AX2 < 0, and AX3 > 0. The first member works 
less but is still in the labor force. But in this case, the reduction in 
A2 and increase in A3 are less likely to make X2* - IN2*1 X3* = 0 since 
w21 has fallen also. Further, if any of the optimal conditions are 
affected, time-intensive activities will be affected positively (i.e., 
increase) and income-intensive activities will be affected nega­
tively (i.e., decrease) as before. On the other hand, for a uniform 
increase in wages we would observe a2 > 0, AA3 < 0, and Aw2i 
> 0. The sign of X2*  Vt,2*1  X3* is not clear but, from the analysis 
above, those time-intensive activities that had behaved like in­
ferior activities for wage reductions will, if affected, tend to be 
reduced in their consumption. A uniform wage increase has, then, 
generated an increase in A2 (i.e., AX2 > 0) and this implies that 
consumption time has been reduced. But whether the change in 
A2 is sufficiently large, in conjunction with a change in A3 of the 
55 opposite direction, to make XI  wz  X  = 0 is not clear. 
However, if there are sufficient time-intensive and inferior ac­
tivities represented in je J, j1+1< j < n, there is reason to believe 
that the second family member may enter the labor force. For a 
uniform change in wages, then, the hypothesis that emerges is 
effectively Long's discouraged worker hypothesis. And the choice 
between these hypotheses depends on whether one assumes that 
wage changes affect only the employed family member or are 
uniform, and whether the optimal conditions are affected. If Z° 
includes inferior and time-intensive activities at the positive level, 
the implications that emerge for any specific change are ac­
centuated. 
56 V. EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Wage rates (or average earnings) and unemployment are but two 
of many recognized factors that influence the aggregate labor 
supply relation. In this monograph the focus on these two 
variables, rather than on the multitude of possible determinants 
of the labor supply, is explained by apparent short-term effects of 
changes in these variables. While any variation in the labor supply 
asks for explanation, it  is the short-run variation of the labor 
force that can affect indexes of the nation's economic health in 
such a manner so as to generate appeals for corrective counter 
measures. In particular, changes in the measured rate of un­
employment, which can result from a change in short-run supply 
as well as from a change in short-run demand, is regarded as 
indicative of changes in the health of the economy and, by way 
of the Employment Act of 1946, can initiate implementation of a 
countering policy. Also, changes in the short-run labor supply can 
have an indirect effect on price levels in the system and, because 
of a  national commitment to "stable" prices, can summon 
counteraction in labor markets. For these reasons, then, changes 
in wage rates and/or unemployment rates can play a prominent 
role in determining short-term economic policy. 
As was indicated in Chapter II, considerable effort has been spent 
on explaining the character of the relation between the aggregate 
labor force participation rate or other, more specific participation 
rates and the variation in wage rates (or average earnings) and 
unemployment. However, these efforts have been along statistical 
lines, and little or no advance has been realized in the theoretical 
model upon which the interpretation of any statistical result is 
based. As mentioned above, the standard income-leisure model 
from which labor supply implications emerge has been subject to 
some very pointed criticism due to several properties of the 
model. These properties are, again, (1) the inherent necessity to 
generate interior solutions in commodity space and, therefore, 
the requirement that everyone work; (2) the specification of the 
model in a manner such that the micro unit is restricted to the 
individual when the general consensus among economists is that a 
family is the relevant unit of analysis in explaining variation in 
the labor supply; and (3) although less disagreeable than proper­
ties (1) and (2) above,the model has utility obtained by "con­
suming" income and leisure when utility  is customarily re­
57 garded as deriving from the consumption of "commodities," and 
thereby the model establishes a very indirect reasoning process en 
route to the maximization of utility. 
Gary Becker's model, in his 1965 article 13] , appeared to offer 
relief from the restrictions posed by these properties if it was 
modified to incorporate the family. The explicit inclusion of time 
as a resource constraint and the specification of consumption 
activities as being "produced" by the individual through pro­
duction functions in which both market goods and time are 
inputs was particularly innovative and promised empirical 
implications not available in the standard model. 
In Chapter IV and as a first approach to the modified Becker 
model, we attempted to apply the calculus to the model, but, for 
a variety of reasons, this approach began breaking down before 
optimal conditions could be derived. In particular, the calculus 
could not assure us that both time and income constraints were 
not violated for an individual. When the problem is expressed in 
terms of a family, Becker's "full income" constraint treats time as 
additive within the family, implying that the time of one family 
member may be substituted for another. By assuming that the 
constraints are not violated, analysis is permitted to proceed to 
the establishment of the necessary optimal conditions. But, the 
derivation of post-optimal implications from the necessary con­
ditions was complicated and even precluded by the vector-defined 
character of the model. 
In recognition of these problems, the economic problem around 
which the model was built was viewed as a nonlinear (concave) 
programming problem. With this approach, the time each family 
member works is an endogenous variable in the system, and, 
hence, the problem is to allocate time between work and con­
sumption activities in a manner that maximizes family utility. 
Each time constraint is recognized explicitly and the opportunity 
to "trade" time between family members does not exist. By way 
of the Kuhn-Tucker analysis, the optimal conditions for a max­
imum contain the Lagrangian multipliers which, in the present 
analysis, are imputed prices or opportunity costs of time and 
income, and, under appropriate assumptions, these multipliers are 
unique. 
In order to  consider the theoretical effects of post-optimal 
58 parameter changes, it was necessary to convert the problem to a 
linear programming analysis in which the Kuhn-Tucker conditions 
from the nonlinear problem are the constraints and the Lagran­
gian multipliers are the endogenous variables. The objective 
function in this case is expressed in differential form because the 
Kuhn-Tucker conditions are only expected to hold in some 
neighborhood around the optimal solution, and this neighbor­
hood must lie in the intersection of the hyperplanes formed from 
the constraints and the family utility function evaluated at the 
optimal point. In this form the equilibrium of the system could 
be displaced by imposing various "shocks" on it. For purposes of 
the present analysis,  it  is the variation of wage rates that is 
important. 
This post-optimality analysis led to a set of empirical implications 
regarding the effects of wage changes on labor force participation. 
These implications were as follows: First, wage reductions ex­
perienced by, what we will call, employed primary wage earners 
in a family will affect the relevant marginal utilities of income 
and time in  a manner so as to increase the participation of 
secondary wage earners, assuming that the wage changes do not 
alter the optimal conditions in the activity set. This is, of course, 
the additional worker hypothesis, and it postulates that labor 
force participation varies inversely with wages. The hypothesis 
does not predict any marked shift in the demand for market 
commodities. Second, if wage changes are assumed to be uniform 
in a family and all optimal conditions are recognized as possibly 
being affected by such changes and if the family's activity set is 
dominated by "normal" activities (i.e., activities for which con­
sumption varies positively with income), it  is less likely that 
secondary wage earners will alter their work status and more 
likely that these wage changes and subsequent changes in the 
vector,  X will push a family's consumption away or toward 
income-intensive  activities and toward or away from time-
intensive activities. 
Put otherwise, this hypothesis is close to the Long position and 
says that labor force participation may vary positively with the 
demand for income-intensive market purchases. The strongest 
form of this second hypothesis emerges in the case where the 
optimal activity set includes many time-intensive inferior activ­
ities. In this case wage reductions are more likely to increase the 
consumption of income-intensive activities. Wage increases, on 
59 the other hand, would produce the opposite set of sign relation­
ships. This form of the second hypothesis supports the prediction 
that both labor force participation and the consumption of in­
come-intensive market commodities vary positively with wage 
changes. 
From a  theoretical  perspective, these hypotheses effectively 
polarize the Woytinsky and Long controversy. Perhaps more 
importantly, an additional discriminating dimension has been 
added by the "either/or" character of the hypotheses. That is, 
either wage changes affect labor force participation inversely or 
the demand for certain classes of activities must vary in a pre­
dictable manner. For policy purposes and in relation to the 
problems of empirically testing and interpreting the hypotheses, 
this  additional dimension  is  a welcome adjunct because  it 
simplifys the specification of a statistical relation and provides a 
broader framework within which to interpret what empirical data 
reveal. As a further testimony to the merit of the hypotheses 
emerging from the above model, we might point out that only 
one hypothesis need be tested because the failure to refute one 
implies refutation of the other. This, of course, greatly simplifies 
the problems of testing. 
The present analysis will not undertake the task of empirical 
testing. However, from the point of view of methodology, it is 
important that the predictions generated above lend themselves 
to meaningful testing, and a brief discussion of this problem is 
appropriate. One approach to this problem would be say, to 
concentrate on the second of the above hypotheses and, after 
making appropriate aggregation assumptions, specify a regression 
relation between the aggregate labor force participation rate, on 
the one hand, and a measure of wage rates as well as a measure of 
the demand for some income-intensive class of market com­
modities. The Bureau of Labor Statistics publishes, on a monthly 
basis in Employment and Earnings, participation rate data as well 
as a set of figures on average hourly earnings in various industries. 
Of this set, average hourly earnings in manufacturing is the most 
common surrogate for the general reference "wage rate." For the 
last variable in this analysis, estimated retail sales in durable goods 
stores seems to be a usable proxy. These data appear in the 
Survey of Current Business monthly. 
Although regression results from such a procedure might prove 
60 interesting and informative, they could not provide a convincing 
explanation of labor force participation rate variation. The reason 
for this lies along two lines. First, while theory specified wages 
and expenditures on income-intensive commodities as indepen­
dent variables in the labor force participation relation, we must 
be aware that theory could also specify a host of other partial 
relations that would be reflected in a more general labor (force) 
supply relation. Some variables in this unspecified set can be 
conceived as influencing the effects of wage or income-intensive 
market expenditure changes on labor force participation. To 
implicitly hold this other set constant may produce grossly 
misleading results.  In short, the failure to more completely 
specify the supply relation can be expected to produce erroneous 
or biased regression coefficients. 
Second, there is the simultaneity problem and all that goes with 
it. Economically, there must be a demand relation that, with its 
supply counterpart, explains the relevant observable data. In 
particular, these two relations together must certainly account for 
average hourly earnings as well as unemployment, which is usual­
ly included in estimates of the supply relation. The mere exist­
ence of a demand relation, which confronts us with the difficulties 
of simultaneous estimation, also raises the identification problem. 
That is, if we had proceeded to estimate a single supply equa­
tionand this is the technique employed by those researchers 
reviewed in Chapter II who used regression techniquesthere 
would be the overriding question of whether the results pertained 
to the supply relation or to the unrecognized demand relation. 
With these observations and for purposes of this presentation, it is 
sufficient to say that the concepts involved in the model's predic­
tions have empirical counterparts, although the available aggre­
gates may be less desirable than, say, precise micro data. Also, the 
model's predictions, although expressed in a partial equilibrium 
framework, are simple and unambiguous. To the extent that one 
or the other of the above hypotheses fails to be refuted by 
empirical data, we can say that the model has enlarged our 
understanding of the behavior that underlies a portion of the 
labor supply decision, and in terms of making rational policy 
decisions it  is an understanding of the behavior that is impor­
tantnot merely an awareness of statistical correlations. 
In conclusion, two features of the above model are worth point­
61 ing out. First, the character of the model does not preclude its 
use for deriving other partial effects in relation to time allocation. 
Examples of other questions might include the effects of changes 
in debt-income ratios or family size. Second, it may be recalled 
that the latter of the model's two hypotheses was suggested to be 
stronger if a number of time-intensive inferior activities were 
included in the optimal solution set at positive levels. Given the 
manner in which consumption activities were  defined as being 
"produced" by combining time and market commodities through 
some production function and given the role that inferior activ­
ities could play in the analysis, it seems clear that the pheno­
menon of inferior activities should be subjected to  additional 
economic inquiry. In the area of manpower analysis and partic­
ularly for understanding observed labor force behavior, the in­
ferior activity concept seems to offer a useful frame of reference, 
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